Glen L. Nicewinter v. David H. Nicewinter and Geneva C. Nicewinter and Marie M. Diner : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1952
Glen L. Nicewinter v. David H. Nicewinter and
Geneva C. Nicewinter and Marie M. Diner : Brief
of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Skeen, Thurman & Worsley; William T. Thurman; Attorneys for Appellants;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Nicewinter v. Nicewinter, No. 7669 (Utah Supreme Court, 1952).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1465
Case No. 7669 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN L. NIC.EWINTER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID H. NICEWINTER and 
GENEVA C. NICEWINTER, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
MARIE M. DIENER, 
Defendant. 
'F: ' A~~LLANTS BRIEF 
~~ -~--~ - r ·: _:/ 
----
\.; \ -~ .. ,' -.; 
.._) I ) L .... • J ./ '- ; 
-- - --~ ; ~~~,,-.': .... ·m·•L"' "' · -SkEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY 
and WILLIAM T. THURMAN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
REVISED TJ\BLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Statement of Facts......................... 1 
Points relied upon by Appellants........... 6 
Point No.1. THE TRn.L COURT ERRED IN 
MlKING AND ENTERING PlffiAGR!PH 1 OF THE 
DECREE (R. 30, 31), THE SAME BEING UN-
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE............... 2 
Point No. 2. THE TR:ooL COURT ERRED IN 
~i!KING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH 11 OF THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT (R. :23), THE ~1E BE-
ING UNSUPPORrED BY THE EVIDENCE •••••••• • 7 
Point No. 3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
MAKING AND ENTERING PARA.GR!APH 1 OF THE 
CONCLUSIONS OF IAW (R. 23), THE SAME BE-
ING UNSUP~ORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT 
- OR THE-EVIDENCE......................... 7 
Point No. 4. THE TP~ COURT ERRED IN 
Mru<ING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH :2 OF THE 
DECREE (R. 31), THE SAME BEING UNSUP-
PORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF F_,ACT OR THE EVIDID-J'CE................................ 7 
Point No. 5. THE TR.:ra COURT ERRED IN 
MAKING MID ENTERING PARAGR!UJH 4 OF THE 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (R. 24), THE SAME BE-
ING UNSUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT 
OR THE EVIDENCE••••••••••••••••••••••••• 7 
Point No. 6. THE TRmL COURT ER.li.ED DI 
MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH 5 -OF THE 
FINDINGS OF lt"'ACT (R. 22), THE S!ME BE-
ING UNSUPPORI'ED BY THE EVIDENCE. • • • • • • • • 7 
Point No. 7. THE TRUL COURT ERRED IN 
mKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
FINDINGS OF FACT (R. 22), THE SAME BE-
ING UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. • • • • • • • • • • 7 
Po:int No. 8. THE TRilL COURT ERRED IN 
MAKING AOO ENTERING PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE 
FTIIDINGS OF FACT {R. 22), THE SAME BE-
ING UNSUPPORI'ED BY THE EVIDENCE ••••••••••• 8 
Point No. 9. THE TRilL COURT ERRED IN 
MlKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH 9 OF THE 
FINDINGS OF FAQT (R. 2.3), THE SAME BE-
ING UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ••••••••••• 8 
.l.rgument: 
Points Nos. 1, 2 and 3 •••••••••••••••••••• 8-14 
Points Nos. 4 .and 5 ••••••••••••••••••••••• 14-16 
Point No. 6••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 16-17 
Point No. 7••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 17-18 
Point No.8 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1S-19 
Point No. 9. • • . •. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 19....:20 
Conclusion •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 20 
Oases &ld Authorities: 
Freidli v. Freidli, 65 Utah 605, 238 P. 647 •• 1.3 
Hathavay v. United Tintic Mines Co., 42 
Utah 520, 132 P. 388 ••••••••• ·• • • • • • • • • • • • • 13 
Needham v. First National Bank of Salt- Lake 
City, 96 Ut·ah 432, 85 P. (2d) 785 ••••••••• 13 
Parrott Bro:s. V o. v. Ogden City, 50 Utah 
512, 167 P. 807 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
Statement .of Facts ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1 
Points relied upon by Appellants: 
No. 1, Entry of paragraph 1 of Decree________________________________ 6 
No. 2, Entry of paragraph 11 of Findings of Fact____________ 7 
No. 3, Entry of paragraph 1 of Conclusions of Law________ 7 
No. 4, Entry of paragraph 2 of Decree________________________________ 7 
No. 5, Entry of pragraph 4 of Conclusions of Law__________ 7 
No. 6, Entry of paragraph 5 of Findings of Fact______________ 7 
No. 7, Entry of paragraph 7 of Findings of Fact______________ 7 
No. 8, Entry of paragraph 8 of Findings of Fact·-----------~- 8 
No. 9, Entry of paragraph 9 of Findings of Fact______________ 8 
Argument: 
Points Nos. 1, 2 and 3------------------------------------------------------------ 8-14 
points NOS. 4 and .5---------------------- c- ------ -----------~---------- ---------- __ 14-16 
Point No. 6. _________________________ ------- __________________ ------- ___________________ .16-17 
Point No. 7 _____________________________________ ---------- ____________ --------------- ____ 1 7-18 
Point No. 8 .. ----------------------- ____________________________________________________ .18-19 
Point No. 9------------------------- _________________________ ---------- ________________ .. 19-20 
Conclusion __ ------------------ _____ __ _ __ ___ ___ _ __ _ __ ____ __ ____ __ ___ _____ __ ___ __ __ _ __ __ _ _ 20 
Cases and Authorities: 
Freidli v. Freidli, 65 Utah 605, 238 P. 647-------------------------- 13 
Hathaway v. United Tintic Mines Co., 42 Utah 
520, 132 p. 388·--------------------------------------------------------------- 13 
Needham v. First National Bank of Salt Lake City, 
96 Utah 432, 85 P. (2d) 785 _______________ ·--------------------------- 13 
Parrott Bros. Vo. v. Ogden City, 50 Utah 512, 167 
p. 807 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE S·UPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN L. NIC.EWINTER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID H. NICEWINTER and 
GENEVA C. NICEWINTER, 
Defendants and Appellants. 





~STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 25, 1947, the appellants, David H. 
Nicewinter and Geneva C. Nicewinter, his wife, entered 
into a contract (R. 19) to purchase from Marie M. 
Diener for the total sum of $11,500.00 the following 
described property: 
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Commencing at a point 2 rds. North of the 
Southwest Corner of Lot 5, Block 18, Plat "A", 
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence North 
4 rds. ; thence East 10 rds. ; thence South 4 rds.; 
thence West 10 rds. to the place of beginning. 
The contract designated the purchasers as joint 
tenants and not as tenants in common, with full rights 
of survivorship. Situated on the property is a nine unit 
apartment house building. 
Subsequently, one of the appellants, David H. Nice-
winter, and his brother, Glen L. Nicewinter, the appellee, 
discussed the possibility of admitting appellee into the 
apartment house venture, with each to contribute funds, 
services and materials, and each to participate in the 
distribution of profits, if any, arising out of the venture. 
An understanding was reached as a result of these 
discussions on or about the 23rd day of February, 1948, 
and the two brothers commenced operating, repairing 
and renovating the apartment house together at about 
that time. 
Disagreements subsequently developed between 
them, and in order to obtain an adjudication of his 
alleged claims, the appellee brought suit against David 
H. Nicewinter, Geneva C.. Nicewinter and Marie M. 
Diener, the vendor of the property. As a result of this 
action, findings of fact (R. 6) and conclusions of law 
(R. 8), and decree (R. 4), were entered on April 29, 
1950. This decree adjudged, among other things, that 
the plaintiff and the defendant David Nicewinter "have 
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a joint venture in the purchase, in1proven1ent and sale" 
of the above described real property. No mention was 
n1ade in the decree of the interest in the business of the 
defendant, Geneva Nicewinter. This decree also pro-
vided (R. 5), that the profits and increase of value of 
said pre1nises should be divided share and share alike 
upon sale thereof (though no mention is made as to the 
parties \Yho shall share in such division) ; that each of 
said brothers (presumably Glen L. and David H. Nice-
winter) should have reasonable living quarters out of 
the premises pending sale thereof, and that within a 
reasonable time said premises should be sold, and an 
accounting be rendered (though the language of this 
portion of the decree is uncertain by virtue of omitted 
words); that in such accounting, each of the brothers 
should receive credit for an equal amount of work 
between February 23, 1948, and November 30, 1949, 
and that Glen L. Nicewinter should be repaid all monies 
and property put into the enterprise in the event the 
sale did not produce enough to repay the contributions 
of said venturers. No mention is made of the interests 
of either Geneva C. Nicewinter or l\{arie M. Diener. 
While it is true that this previous judgment, ren-
dered April 29, 1950, is not the one here involved, the 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree were 
pleaded in the suit which is the subject of this appeal, 
and proper consideration of the problem presented by 
the decree herein, must necessarily refer to this previous 
decree. 
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Following the adjudication of this initial case, a 
second action ( R. 1), was filed by the same plaintiff 
against the same defendants, and a decree (R. 30) in 
the second action was made and entered on February 21, 
1951. It is with such second decree that this appeal is 
directly concerned. 
Appellants freely confess that it is most difficult to 
present the facts underlying this case, because in a 
literal sense of the word, there was no evidence intro-
duced in this action, and the matter was submitted to 
the trial court for decision upon a stipulation (R. 20), 
which is limited in extent and by no means clear, as 
will be pointed out in the argument. It is with extreme 
reluctance and hesitancy that appellants refer to mat-
ters outside the record, but unfortunately, there would 
seem to be no alternative. 
Subsequent to the time that this case was at issue, 
the written stipulation was presented to the court, which 
stipulation reads in essential part as follows: 
"IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND 
AGREED that said contract shall be delivered to 
the clerk of Judge Ray Van Cott's court by at-
torney Franklin Dunn Richards on or before the 
13th day of February, 1951, and that the above 
entitled court by said Judge may sell said prop-
erty and all interest therein to the highest bidder 
as between plaintiff Glen L. Nicewinter and 
David H. Nicewinter as defendant." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
So far as \Ve are now advised, at the same time 
that the written stipulation was presented, there were 
some informal discussions bet,veen counsel of record at 
that time for all parties, and the court, in regard to 
the case. The record, ho\vever, is silent as to the effect 
or substance of these informal discussions, and there 
seen1s to be no order based thereon other than the ulti-
mate decree (R. 30), which was made and entered on 
February 21, 1951. 
This decree provided that the premises involved 
should be sold at the courtroom of the trial court at 
9 :15 A.M. on Friday, March 9, 1951, and that notice of 
such sale be given by serving upon appellants' attorney 
a five-day notice prior to sale. The premises described 
included not only the real property, but also the furni-
ture, furnishings and appliances located therein. The 
decree further provided that the property be sold only 
to the highest bidder as between appellee, Glen L. Nice-
\Vinter, and one of the appellants, David H. Nicewinter, 
and that the liquidated sum of $8,000.00 due the said 
Glen L. Nicewinter, as allegedly adjudged by previous 
decree of court dated April 29, 1950, might be applied 
as cash by appellee in bidding at said sale. The decree 
further provided that within five days after sale, the 
unsuccessful bidder vacate and deliver up possession of 
the property to the successful bidder, and that proceeds 
of sale be deposited with the Clerk of Court for dis-
position in accordance with an account to be subsequent-
ly adjudicated. 
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At the time of the sale on March 9, 1951, at 9:30 
A.M., present counsel for the appellants moved for a 
continuance of the sale until 1 :30 P.M. the same day, a 
request made subsequent to a previous request to the 
court to withhold sale until disposition of a prospective 
motion for a new trial (R. 48). The trial court granted 
the continuance to 1 :30 P.M., and, in the interim, this 
appeal was perfected. 
At the time of the hearing on the sale of March 9, 
1951, at 9 :30 A.M., appellee called to the witness stand 
Marie M. Diener, the owner of the real property, who 
testified as to details of the contract of sale between 
herself as seller and David H. and Geneva C. Nicewinter, 
as buyers, and the then existent balance due thereon 
of $2,900.00 (R. 47). At this time also, the contract of 
sale, Exhibit "A", was introduced in evidence. This 
brief testimony and exhibit constitute all of the testi-
mony and the exhibit introduced in the case. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
BY APPELLANTS 
Appellants rely upon the following points: 
POINT No. 1 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE DECREE (R. 30, 31), THE 
SAME BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
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POINT No. 2 
TilE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
JNG PARAGRAPH 11 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT (R. 23), 
'l'HE SAME BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT No. 3 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF L.AW 
(R. 23), THE SAME BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE FIND-
INGS OF FACT OR THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT No.4 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER.-
ING PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE DECREE (R. 31), THE .SAME 
BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT OR 
THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT No. 5 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(R. 24), THE SAME BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT OR THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT No. 6 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT (R. 22), 
THE SAME BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT No. 7 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT (R. 22), 
THE SAME BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
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POINT No.8 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT (R. 22), 
THE SAME BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT No. 9 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING PARAGRAPH 9 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT (R. 23), 
THE SAME BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
Points Nos. 1, 2 and 3 
Paragraph 11 of the findings of fact (R. 23), para-
graph 1 of the conclusions of law (R. 23), and paragraph 
1 of the decree (R. 30, 31), upon which the above points 
are based, are concerned with essentially the same mat-
ter, and will be argued together. For the convenience 
of the court, these paragraphs are set forth as follows: 
Findings of Fact 
"11. That said decree further provided that 
plaintiff should be repaid all monies and property 
which he has put into said enterprise in the event 
there was not enough to repay both of them for 
all their contributions thereto, and said monies 
and property to be repaid has been determined 
by Decree of this court to be adjudicated to be a 
sum of $8,000.00 to be repaid in the event there 
was not even enough to repay both of them for 
all their contributions thereto." 
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Conclusions of Law 
"That all interest of Glen L. Nicewinter and 
David H. Nicewinter and Geneva C. Nicewinter 
in and to the hereinafter described real property 
together with the contract for the purchase there-
of fron1 niarie ~1. Diener should be sold to the 
highest bidder of the said Glen L. Nicewinter 
and David H. Nicewinter in open court for cash 
and that the liquidated sum of $8,000.00 due to 
the said Glen L. Nicewinter may be applied as 
cash in the bidding at said sale, and * * •" 
Decree 
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED that all interest of Glen L. Nice-
winter and David H. Nicewinter and Geneva C. 
Nicewinter in and to the real property located 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and described 
hereinafter be sold to the highest bidder as be-, 
tween the said Glen L. Nicewinter and David H. 
Nicewinter in open court for cash, and that the 
liquidated sun1 of $8,000.00 due to the said Glen 
L. Nicewinter as adjudged by this court by Decree 
dated the 28th day of April, 1950, may be applied 
by him as cash in bidding at said sale, and * * *" 
Although it does not so specify, paragraph 11 of 
the findings probably refers to the decree in the previous 
action (R. 25), dated April 29, 1950. That previous 
decree, however, does not contain a single word as to 
the fact that the sum of $8,000.00 was due to the said 
Glen L. Nicewinter, or that such a sum was "to be 
repaid in the event there was not even enough to repay 
both of them for all their contributions thereto." It is 
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difficult to conceive how any court could enter such find-
ing, as there is not a scintilla of evidence in the record 
to support the same. 
Paragraph 1 of the decree not only repeats this 
error, but compounds the same. In addition to finding 
that the su1n of $8,000.00 is due, the decree goes on to 
provide that this amount might be used at the courtroom 
sale by appellee as a cash credit. Again, appellants 
assert that there is no basis in law or fact upon which 
such a provision could be based. Paragraph 1 of the 
conclusions of law is to the same effect. 
The parties involved are individuals of limited 
means, and the vital importance of this provision is 
apparent. Presumably both appellee and appellant, 
David H. Nicewinter, placed substantial sums of money 
into the reconstruction and improvement of this apart-
ment building, which investments consumed the avail-
able assets of both individuals. David L. Nicewinter 
asserts that his investment is in excess of $12,000.00. 
The net effect of the order, however, is to allow appellee 
a credit for a claimed investment of $8,000.00, but appel-
lant, David H. Nicewinter, whose interest should be of 
greater or at least equal standing, has no credit of any 
kind available. Thus, at the sale, the appellee was in a 
position to bid the sum of $8,000.00 or even a lesser 
amount, and it is entirely probable that appellant, David 
H. Nicewinter, could not by any stretch of the imagina-
tion exceed this amount. In net effect, therefore, the 
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likelihood was that appellee, with a bid of $8,000.00 or 
less without any cash, would not only acquire a property 
worth upwards of $20,000.00, but at the same time would 
"Tipe out an equity of the appellant, David H. Nice-
winter, of at least $12,000.00. There is certainly nothing 
contemplated in the stipulation between the parties 
(R. 20) which would permit in any way such a result, 
and the finding, conclusion and the decree most cer-
tainly violate the most primitive concepts of justice. 
Appellants' objections (R. 33) were entirely ignored. 
Although the decree clearly contemplates a later and 
ultimate accounting, and in no part of the proceedings 
has there ever been such an account, the net effect of 
this decree is a partial accounting, not based upon evi-
dence, granting to appellee an unjustly advantageous 
position at time of sale. 
It is also noted that the decree provides that there 
shall be only two bidders at the sale, appellee, Glen 
L. Nicewinter, and appellant, David H. Nicewinter. The 
contract of purchase of the property (R. 19), however, 
vests the equities of the same in Geneva C. and David 
H. Nicewinter as joint tenants. Throughout the pro-
ceedings and particularly this provision of the decree, 
the one-half interest of Geneva C. Nicewinter, appel-
lant, has been completely ignored. It is again incon-
ceivable that any court could in effect wipe out such an 
interest "\vithout any foundation to do so, either in fact 
or in law. 
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It may be claimed by the appellee that the stipula-
tion (R. 20) justifies the action of the court. As has 
been indicated above, the decree and findings of the 
court extend far beyond the scope of this stipulation, 
which says nothing as to the finding of $8,000.00 due 
appellee, nor of the existence of a credit in this amount 
available to him at the sale. Moreover, it is extremely 
doubtful as to whether the stipulation refers to the 
same contract as that introduced in evidence as it refers 
to "that certain Uniform Real Estate Contract dated 
September 25, 1947, between Marie M. Diener as seller 
and David H. Nicewinter and Glen L. Nicewinter as 
purchasers * * * ." Examination of the only contract 
in the record, Exhibit "A" (R. 19), shows that it is not 
the same as that above described. The purchasers under 
this exhibit are not David H. Nicewinter and Glen L. 
Nicewinter, but Dave H. Nicewinter and Geneva C. 
Nicewinter, his wife, as joint tenants. Again, emphasis 
on the fact that the proceedings completely ignore appel-
lant Geneva C. Nicewinter. In this connection, we point 
out that this stipulation is not executed by the parties, 
but only by counsel of record, and further that Marie 
M. Diener, party defendant, is not in any way connected 
with or party signator on the stipulation, nor is there 
anything to show that she was even aware of its exist-
ence. As vendor and title holder to the real property 
involved, she most certainly has a direct interest in the 
proceedings, which appellee recognized at the outset 
of the case as she was made a party defendant. 
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Applicable law in regard to the necessity of eVI-
dence upon which to base a finding of fact is well estab-
lished by this court. In Hathaway v. United Tintic 
Mines Co., 42 Utah 520, 132 P. 388, at page 522 the 
Court states : 
"The finding of facts and entering of judg-
ments are solemn acts, and no court should permit 
itself to make a finding of fact where the record 
is conclusive, as in this case, that there is abso-
lutely no evidence to support such finding." 
The relation between conclusions of law and find-
ings of fact is well stated in Parrott Bros. Vo. v. Ogden 
City, 50 Utah 512, 167 P. 807, at page 515: 
"It is fundamental that the conclusions of law 
must be predicted upon and find their support in 
the findings of fact, and the judgment must follow 
the conclusions of law; and where, as here, the 
conclusions of law are so palpably at variance 
with the findings, there is no alternative but to 
order and require the lower court to set aside its 
erroneous conclusions of law and substitute con-
clusions that will entitle the appellant to, and 
enter, a judgment in accordance with its express 
findings of fact." 
See also Friedli v. Friedli, 65 Utah 605, 238 P. 647; 
Needham v. First National Bank of Salt Lake City, 96 
Utah 432, 85 P. (2d) 785. 
We believe it is apparent under the authorities that 
there is absolutely no foundation upon which the decree 
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and the conclussions can be based, either in the evidence 
itself, which is in reality non-existent, or the findings of 
fact. These errors are extremely prejudicial, and place 
appellant, David H. Nicewinter, in a wholly untenable 
position. Moreover, and as we have indicated above, 
it ignores the interest of Geneva C. Nicewinter, and the 
actual owner of the property, Marie M. Diener. 
Points Nos. 4 and 5 
Paragraph 2 of the decree (R. 31), and paragraph 
4 of the conclusions of law (R. 23, 24), are concerned with 
essentially the same matter, and since they are the para-
graphs upon which the above point::; are based, will be 
argued together. For the convenience of the court, these 
paragraphs are set forth as follows: 
Decree 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, AD-
JUDGED AND DECREED that said sale shall be 
conducted in the courtroom of Judge Ray Van 
Cott, Jr., at 9 :15 o'clock A. M. on F·riday, the 
9th day of March, 1951, and that notice of said 
sale shall be given by serving upon the said 
Franklin Dunn Richards, attorney, a notice there-
of at least five days prior to said sale, and that 
the property and premises herein referred to are 
described as : 
Commencing at a point 2 rds. North of 
the Southwest Corner of Lot 5, Block 18, 
Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey, and run-
ning thence North 4 rds. ; thence East 10 rds. ~ 
thence South 4 rds.; thence West 10 rds. to 
the place of beginning, subject to and to-
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gether with a contract dated September 25, 
194 7, with Marie M. Diener, seller, and to--
gether with all furniture, furnishings and 
appliances appertaining to said joint venture 
premises, and" 
Conclusions of Law 
"That the property and premises herein re-
ferred to are located in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, and particularly described as: 
Commencing at a point 2 rds. North of 
the Southwest Corner of Lot 5, Block 18, 
Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey, and rrm-
ning thence North 4 rds. ; thence East 10 rds. ; 
thence South 4 rds. ; thence West 10 rds. to 
the place of beginning, subject to and to-
gether with a contract dated September 25, 
1947, with Marie M. Diener, seller, and to-
gether with all furniture, furnishings and ap-
pliances appertaining to said joint venture 
premises." 
The above portion of the decree places the time 
of sale at 9 :15 A. M. on Friday, the 9th day of March, 
1951, and provides for service of notice thereof upon 
counsel for appellants. The paragraph also proceeds 
to describe the property involved in the sale by metes 
and bounds, and then adds, "together with all furniture, 
furnishings and appliances appertaining to said joint 
venture premises *". For the first time in these proceed-
ings and litigation, the personal property located in this 
apartment house comes to light in this order of sale. 
No mention is made of this personal property in the 
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complaint (R. 1), nor in the answer (R. 10), nor in the 
so-called answer to counterclaim (R. 13). No mention 
is made of thiS personal property in the previous decree 
(R. 26), nor in the findings upon which such previous 
decree was based, and particularly paragraph 2 thereof 
(R. 27). Paragraph 4 of the findings in the instant case 
describes the property (R. 22) as being solely real prop-
erty, without mention of any pe-rsonality or furnishings. 
Nor is such mention made elsewhere in the findings of 
the instant case, upon which the conclusions of law and 
the decree are based. In other words, the court has 
suddenly included in the subject of litigation and order 
of sale, personal property not heretofore mentioned or 
involved. It is impossible to understand by what right 
or authority the trial court ordered the sale of this per-
sonal property, and to~ do so is highly and irrevocably 
prejudicial to the appellants herein. For all that appears 
in the record, this may involve property, for example, 
of the appellant, Geneva C. Nicewinter, used in her 
personal apartment, or it may involve property on the 
premises owned and belonging to the seller, Marie M. 
Diener. There is clearly cause, upon this ground alone, 
to remand this case for a new trial. 
Point No.6 
Paragraph 5 of the findings of fact (R. 22) reads as 
follows: 
"5. That said property is being purchased 
from defendant Marie M. Diener and that defend-
ant Geneva C. Nicewinter is the wife of David 
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H. Nicewinter and has some statutory interest 
in defendant David H. Nicewinter's interest 
therein." 
As we have previously pointed out, the appellant, 
Geneva C. Nicewinter, under the terms of contract of 
purchase of the property here involved, Exhibit "A" 
(R. 19), was one of two purchasers in joint tenancy, 
and presumably as a result of this written contract, 
she had a one-half interest in the real property. Not-
withstanding this evidence, which cannot be contradicted, 
this finding recites that her interest is "some statutory 
interest in defendant, David H. Nicewinter's interest 
therein." This is a manifest error, and constitutes a 
concrete illustration of the manner in which the find-
ings and decree have ignored a very definite property 
interest. Not only, moreover, has this interest been 
ignored, but the finding in net effect sets up a vague 
' interest which it is submitted does not exist. The im-
portance of this error lies not only in the fact that this 
property interest has been ignored, but also in the fact 
that it indicates one of the premises by which the court 
has totally ignored the rights of appellant Geneva C. 
Nicewinter insofar as division of proceeds of sale and 
profits from the venture are concerned. 
Point No.7 
This point is concerned with paragraph 7 of the find-
ings of fact (R. 22), which paragraph reads as follows: 
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"7. This court further found that each of 
said brothers and his wife shall have reasonable 
living quarters out of said premises pending sale 
thereof and further ordered that within a reason-
able time said premises shall be sold to the best 
advantage and thereupon an accounting shall be 
made between them in accordance with the terms 
of this order, and;" 
Paragraph 7 of the complaint alleges that the court, 
in the preceding case, found that the parties "shall have 
reasonable living quarters out of said premises pending 
the sale thereof." This is denied in paragraph 2 of the 
answer (R. 10). The above finding of fact repeats the 
allegation of the complaint, and yet there is not a scintilla 
of evidence in this record upon which such finding could 
be based. Again, there is an illustration of the manner 
in which the lower court has followed the allegations of 
the complaint which had been denied, and thereby placed 
in direct issue, without any foundation upon which it 
could do so. 
Point No.8 
This point is concerned with paragraph 8 of the find-
ings of fact (R. 22), which reads as follows: 
"8. That a reasonable time has now expired 
but said premises have not been sold." 
As in regard to Point No. 7 above, this is an instance 
where the complaint, in paragraph 8 (R. 2), makes an 
allegation of fact which is denied by the answer, and 
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again, there is not a scintilla of evidence in the record 
upon which any such finding could be predicated, and to 
make such a finding is again manifest error. 
Point No.9 
This point is concerned with paragraph 9 of the 
findings of fact (R. 23), which reads as follows: 
"9. That defendant David H. Nicewinter 
received approximately $400.00 per month gross 
rentals from said premises, for which he has made 
no accounting to plaintiff, notwithstanding plain-
tiff's demand therefore and notwithstanding that 
said business is a joint venture." 
Paragraph 9 of the complaint (R. 2) alleges that 
appellant, David H. Nicewinter, received approximately 
$400.00 per month gross rentals from said premises, 
which allegation is denied in the answer. Once again, 
there is no evidence in the record to support this find-
ing of fact, it is clearly error, and is again indicative of 
the manner in which the trial court has followed the alle-
gations of the complaint in its findings, without any 
foundation of fact or stipulation upon which to do so. 
Moreover, since the decree contemplates an ultimate 
accounting between these parties, such a finding, which 
we are advised is contrary to the facts, may ultimately 
prove of substantial importance, as it definitely fixes an 
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Income and receipt of monies from the property. The 
finding is moreover vague, because it fails to specify 
the period during which this sum is allegedly received 
by appellant, David H. Nicewinter, and again may be 
of importance because this joint venture was established 
for a defined and limited period. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants are fully cognizant of the limited citation 
of authority for the assertions contained in the argu-
ment. The principles of law, however, would seem to be 
so well established and free from ambiguity that further 
authority would be merely surplusage. 
It is submitted that the seriousness and frequency of 
prejudicial error which has occurred in this action, not 
only makes it utterly impossible to determine with any 
degree of accuracy the rights and respective positions 
of the parties, particularly Geneva C. Nicewinter, but 
that these proceedings are so thoroughly confused that 
there is only one possible solution. A new trial should 
be granted, which will necessarily give, and in reality 
for the first time, all parties concerned an opportunity 
to present adequate evidence in support of their respec-
tive positions and rights, to attain ~ equitable account-
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ing of this joint venture, and if deemed advisable, a sale 
of the premises and definition of property involved in 
the sale, which will be consistent with justice. 
We submit that more than any case within our ex-
perience, however limited that experience may be, this 
case is one wherein a new trial should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY 
and WILLIAM T. THURMAN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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